Bowe v. United States
Decision
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Opinion of the Court
The Facts
Michael S. Bowe pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, with an additional conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) for using a firearm during the robbery. His §924(c) conviction carried a mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively. Years later, Supreme Court precedent (Davis and Taylor) called into question whether his conviction was valid—Davis invalidated the residual clause for vagueness, and Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause.
The Issue
Whether a federal prisoner can file a successive motion for postconviction relief under §2255(h) when the law has changed after his conviction, even if prior circuit precedent treated the conduct as valid.
Bowe argued that he qualified for successive motion relief under the new rule announced in Davis, which invalidated the residual clause. The government argued that because circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence under the elements clause, Bowe could not show his conviction was unconstitutional under the new rule.
The Rules
A federal prisoner seeking a second or successive motion for postconviction relief must first obtain certification from a court of appeals that the motion meets threshold conditions before proceeding in district court.
The residual clause in §924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause. Announced a retroactive constitutional rule permitting postconviction relief.
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of §924(c)(3)(A). Vague predicates cannot support §924(c) convictions.
Postconviction relief petitions are subject to gatekeeping requirements that require certification of a substantial question before successive motions can proceed.
The Application
Section 924(c) is a staple of federal criminal sentencing. When prosecutors pair a predicate crime (robbery, arson, drug trafficking) with a firearm allegation, §924(c) triggers a mandatory minimum sentence to be stacked on top. Bowe's mandatory 10 years was consecutive to his robbery sentence. The statute defines crimes of violence in two ways: the elements clause (focusing on what the predicate offense requires) and the residual clause (a catch-all for any offense that "presents a substantial risk of physical injury"). The residual clause sounded like common sense until the Supreme Court found it too vague in Davis.
When Davis announced that the residual clause was unconstitutional, it created a new rule that applied retroactively. But retroactivity is not automatic relief. AEDPA gatekeeping rules still apply: a prisoner needs certification from a court of appeals to file a second or successive §2255 motion. Bowe's Eleventh Circuit panel found that even under the new Davis rule, his conviction might be solid because attempted Hobbs Act robbery satisfied the elements clause. The panel locked the door before Bowe could litigate the question. The Supreme Court had to decide whether AEDPA gatekeeping permits prisoners to proceed when the legal landscape has shifted but the answer is unclear.
The Conclusion
**The Supreme Court held that prisoners may proceed with successive motions when Supreme Court precedent changes the law and creates a substantial question about the validity of their conviction, even if courts had previously upheld that conviction under the old law.** AEDPA gatekeeping cannot bar relief when the precedential ground has shifted.
The decision protects prisoners' access to habeas corpus when doctrinal changes happen after conviction. It reflects the reality that criminal law evolves—yesterday's solid conviction may be yesterday's precedent, and prisoners deserve a chance to litigate the new rule.
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